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Natural resources, Institutional Quality and Economic growth: An African 
Tale  
Boniface Ngah Epo and Dief Reagen Nochi Faha 
Abstract 
 
This study investigates the role of institutions in the relationship between natural resources 
and economic growth using a panel data of 44 African countries over the period 1996-2016. 
We use natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP and the share of ores and metals in 
total merchandise exports as variables for natural resources and six indicators of institutional 
quality. To check for endogenetity, heterogeneity and non-linearity we undertake a cross-
sectional instrumental variable analysis, a system dynamic panel-data instrumental variable 
regression and panel smooth transition regression. The relationship between natural 
resources on economic growth vary for indicators of institutional quality and the measure for 
natural resources. The non-linear relationship between natural resources and economic 
growth is significantly ameliorate when we consider the variables rule of law and regulations 
and quality for both natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP and the share of ores and 
metals to total export. 
Keywords: Natural resources, economic growth, institutions, panel threshold and Africa 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The 2013 African Development Bank (ADB) report questions’ the importance of natural 
resource exploitation in the process of economic development (ADB, 2014). Rents from 
resources can serve as productive assets and help finance promising sectors of the economy 
(Joya, 2015). Overall and over time, most African countries have largely been dependent on 
natural resources, with very little diversification. Failure to diversify their economies prevent 
resource rich countries from having sustained growth and reducing the effect of growth 
volatility associated with resource dependence.  
 
Natural resources constitute an important source of national wealth for most African countries 
(Diaw and Lessoua, 2013). Yet, rents from natural resources are solely not sufficient to bring 
about economic prosperity and progress. Over the last two centuries, the relationship between 
natural resources and economic growth reveals mixed results. In the nineteenth century and 
end of the first half of the twentieth century, countries like Australia, Scandinavia and United 
State recorded positive development experiences in which natural resources played a 
significant role in stirring economic growth. However, it is hard to find such successful 
experiences in the second half of the twentieth century because countries that largely depend 
on natural resources, have been associated with the “Natural resource curse
1
” thesis (Atkison 
and Hamilton, 2003; Sachs and Warner, 1995).  
 
                                                          
1
 Natural resource curse refers to the seemingly counterintuitive observation that resource-abundant countries 
often appear to grow more slowly than those with fewer resources. 
Countries with poor economic governance or weak institutions adopt inadequate 
industrialization programs that do not structurally changing their economies (Matti, 2009). 
This observation may be heightened during periods of abundant natural resource exploitation. 
Other studies find negative effects of resources, via institutional decay, to economic growth 
(Gylfason and Zoega, 2001; and Murshed, 2003). In this regard, it is important for African 
countries that rely heavily on rents from natural resources to drive their development towards 
understanding how robust institutions could positively impact on the relationship between 
natural resources and economic growth. 
 
Economic theory argues that institutions influence how natural resources are managed. This 
influence is perceived in terms of competing or complimentary interests between institutions 
and production in the natural resource sector. According to Mehlum et al. (2006a), production 
and rent-seeking are competing if the most effective rent-seeking activities are located outside 
the productive part of the economy. This competing scenario encourages rent seeking 
behavior and vested interest that may bias the management of gains from natural resources 
through bad institutions. This in turn may negatively affect economic growth and potential 
shared prosperity.  
 
Recent empirical studies show that institutions play an important role in development and 
consolidating economic growth (Mehlum et al., 2006b; Mavrotas et al., 2011; Sala-i-Martin 
and Subramanian, 2013). Good institutional quality is a prerequisite for economic growth 
(Boschini et al., 2013). Therefore, how institutions are governed should significantly affect 
natural resource sectors. According to Collier and Hoeffler (2005), natural resource is likely 
to increase the chances of political instability, which should probably be negative for growth. 
Likewise, Omgba (2010) argues that with increasing wealth from resources, the payoff from 
staying in power grows and politicians tend to avoid adopting good governance practices that 
should lead to poor growth performance.   
 
Researchers find mixed results when studying the relationship between natural resources and 
economic growth. Some authors find a positive relationship (Haber and Menaldo, 2011; 
Arezki and van der Ploeg, 2007), other authors find a negative relationship (Auty, 1993; 
Sachs and Warner, 2001), whereas some authors find that this relationship is contingent with 
the level of institutional quality (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2013). The different results 
obtained by these researchers may be attributed to the nature of the relationship between 
natural resources and growth which is non-linear. 
 
This study empirically contributes to the very limited number of studies that assesses the role 
institutions play in ameliorating the relationship between natural resource and economic 
growth in Africa. This study differs from Ndjokou and Tsopmo (2017), Belarbi et al. (2015) 
and Damette and Seghir (2018) in the following manner. First, we focus on 44 African 
countries (see annex for list of countries) unlike Ndjokou and Tsopmo (2017) which consider 
only 18 countries in SSA. Second, we use two different measures of natural resources. They 
include natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP and the share of ores and metal exports 
on merchandise export. Third, we use all the six indicators of institutional quality proposed by 
the World Bank in an attempt to answer to the critic that natural resources curse is sensitive to 
the measure of both natural resources and institutions. Fourth, we estimate a cross-sectional 
and a system dynamic panel data analysis using conventional instruments or variables 
suggested in the literature to test for endogeneity of indicators of institutional quality using 
the two measures of natural resources. Fifth, we adopt the panel threshold estimation to 
control for heterogeneity and non-linearity.    
 
The observation that African countries need robust economic growth for its development, rely 
on their natural resource endowments and suffers from poor institutional quality is the 
underlying relationship we attempt to investigate. In this regard, failure to observe structural 
transformations that causes economic growth in Africa can in part be associated to (1) their 
high dependence on natural resources forcing their economies to be primarily based on 
exporting raw materials and (2) low institutional willingness to build robust institutions due to 
rent seeking behavior favored by competing interest between the production in the natural 
resource sectors and institutions. Consequently, identifying the institutional threshold level 
and the structure of regime change (whether brutal or smooth) that is necessary to ameliorate 
the relationship between natural resource rents and economic growth in Africa should help in 
policy formulation.  
 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the role institutions play on the relationship 
between natural resources on economic growth using a panel data of 44 African countries 
over the period 1996-2016. Specifically, we examine to what extent the effect of natural 
resources on growth depends on (1) the measure of natural resources, (2) the indicator of 
institutional quality and (3) the methodology used for estimations.  
 
II. Literature review 
 
Questions on the importance of natural resources on development has been extensively 
debated.  On issues associated with the effect of natural resources on economic development, 
we observe two trends in the literature. The first trend investigates the relationship between 
abundant natural resources and economic growth (Auty, 1993; Sachs and Warner, 1995; 
1999; 2001). The second trend analyses the effects of institutions on the natural resource-
growth relationship (Mehlum et al., 2006a; Bhattacharya and Hodder, 2010; Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian, 2013). 
 
Concerning the relationship between natural resources and economic growth, Sachs and 
Warner (1995; 1999) use a broad panel of countries to examine the effect of natural resources, 
measured by the share of primary product exports, on GDP. They suggest a negative effect of 
natural resources on growth. Similar results have also been obtained by Auty (2001), 
Gylfason et al., (1999), Gylfason (2001) and Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (20013) using 
different variables and specifications.  This negative effect of resources on growth is what is 
commonly called the resource curse. 
 
Regarding the concept of resource curse, the literature identifies economic and 
institutional/political factors as the two main factors that explain this curse. On economic 
factors, the literature identifies the volatility of the revenue of primary factors or the 
misallocation of production factors as explaining Dutch diseases (Sachs and Warner, 2001; 
Auty, 2001; Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009). For institutional and political factors 
explaining resource curse, several studies exist (Easterly and Levine, 2003; Ishman et al., 
2005; Bulte et al., 2005; Tsani, 2013). The principal argument suggested is that wealth 
generated by resources increases rent-seeking behaviour and corruption (Leite and Weidmann 
(1999); Dalgaard and Olsson (2008)) or may cause deterioration in the quality of institutions 
(Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (20013) and Ishman et al., (2005). 
 
On the relationship between institutions and natural resource-growth relationship, it is 
recognized that wealth from natural resources affect the type of regime. Wantchekon (2002) 
using a sample of 141 countries over the period 1950-1990 argues that one percent increase in 
the share of primary export to GDP increases by 8 percent the probability of a government to 
exercise authoritarian power. Collier and Hoeffler (2009) and Ross (2001) investigate the 
effect of rents of natural resources on the economic performances (medium term-economic 
growth) of democracies. These authors find that autocracies are significantly outperformed by 
democracies in the absence of resources rents. On the contrary, when the share of resources 
rents to GDP is high, democracies are outperformed by autocracies.  
 
Furthermore, several studies identify that a boom in natural resources impede economic 
growth through the occurrence of diffused corruption, “grabbing institutions” or a poor rule of 
law (Mehlum et al., 2006a and 2006b; Bhattacharya and Hodder, 2010; Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian, 2013). Robinson et al., (2006) focusing on the political economy framework 
show how political incentives are crucial in understanding the effect resources have on 
growth.  
 
Recently, Mavrotas et al. (2011) investigating the link between natural resources, institutional 
development and economic growth in 56 developing countries over the period 1970–2000. 
They find that natural resources contribute positively to growth when the country has a good 
level of governance and democracy. Likewise, Belarbi et al., (2015) examining the combined 
interaction effects of oil resources dependence and institutions on economic growth show that 
the effect of the former on economic growth becomes positive when the quality of institutions 
improves. Good governance, stronger democratic institutions and low levels of corruption 
significantly enhance economic growth in a study comprising of 32 abundant resource rich 
countries and 47 non-resource rich countries (El Anshashy and Katshaiti, 2013). Furthermore, 
Bulte et al., (2005) indicate that natural resource abundance promotes economic growth which 
they explain by the ‘windfall’ flow of income from resource extraction. This flow has a direct 
effect on the economy and an indirect effect through improving institutional quality. 
 
Nonetheless, an overview of empirical literature on the relationship between natural 
resources, institutions and growth can be grouped into the following observations. The first 
set of observations can be associated to results that find that natural resources have a negative 
effect on growth in the presence of weak institutions (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2013 
and Belarbi et al., 2015). The second set of observation can be associated to results that 
suggests a positive relationship between natural resources and economic growth (Haber and 
Menaldo, 2011; Arezki and van der Ploeg, 2007). The third set of observation of highlight 
results that indicate that natural resources interact with the quality of institutions and the 
combined effect of these two factors on growth will depend on the nature of this interaction 
(Mehlum et al., 2006a).  
 
Case studies also outline the importance of institutional quality in analyzing the effect of 
natural resources on growth (Dunning, 2008).  A good example often mentioned in the 
literature is the case of Botswana where the discovery of Diamond in the 1970s has sustained 
impressive economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2003). However, the same discovery of 
diamond in Angola and Liberia has instead fueled conflict rather than improving growth 
(Olsson, 2007; Le Billion, 2008). Similarly, the discovery of oil in Norway (blessing), Nigeria 
and Equatorial Guinea (curse) has different effects (Larsen, 2004; Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian, 2013, Toto Same, 2008). Another popular case study is the Democratic 
Republic of Congo where despite being heavily endowed with natural resources has been 
witnessing conflict and a deterioration of growth and the standard of living (Lalji, 2007).   
 
In closing, a key trend from studies is the important role of institutions in analyzing the 
relationship between natural resources and growth. Nonetheless, it important to adequately 
treat issues associated to methodological and estimation aspects in analyzing the relation 
between institutions, natural resources and economic growth in a heterogenous setup like 
African continent. 
 
We contribute to empirical literature by investigating the role of institution on the relationship 
between natural resources on economic growth in Africa using a panel data including 44 
African countries. This study contributes to the gaps found in literature by: (1) using two 
different measures of natural resources. These measures are natural resource rents as a 
percentage of GDP and the share of ores and exports on merchandise exported for 44 African 
countries; (2) using the six different types of indicators of institutional quality suggested by 
the World Bank; and (3) adopting different specifications and methods of estimations which 
accounts for endogeneity of the choice of institutions.  
 
In this regard, we first compute the direct effect of natural resources on economic growth and 
the combined effect of natural resources for each indicator of institutions using a cross-
sectional instrumental variable regression. Second, we estimate a system dynamic panel 
estimation which accounts for potential endogeneity for the six variables of institutional 
quality suggested by the world bank. Third, we use a Panel threshold model to estimate the a 
non-linear institution-natural resource-growth relation for all six indicators of institutional 
quality and also control for heterogeneity.   
 
III.  Methodology, Model specifications tests and Data 
III.1. Methodology 
 
In this paper, the theoretical specification of our empirical model is based on the model 
suggested by Mankiw et al. (1992), which is an augmented Solow (1956) type growth model 
that includes human capital.  In this model, the production function is of Cobb–Douglas type 
and the stock of human capital depreciates at the same rate as physical capital. Similarly, the 
endogenous growth model purported by Lucas (1988) indicates, that investment in human 
capital, innovation, and knowledge are significant contributors to economic growth.  
 
To estimate our empirical model, we opt for a panel data regression model. In regression 
models for panel data, it is typically assumed that heterogeneity associated to the nature of the 
data can be captured by means of (random or fixed) individual effects and time effects, such 
that the coefficients of the observed explanatory variables are identical for all observations. In 
many empirical applications, this poolability assumption may be violated and therefore 
warrants the adoption of techniques that may account more robustly for heterogeneity.  
 
We suggest using the panel smooth transition regression (PSTR) model. This approach 
presents both advantages and disadvantages. Concerning advantages, the PSTR specifications 
allow the natural resources-growth coefficient to vary between countries and also overtime. 
This provides a simple way to appraise the heterogeneous nature of the relationship between 
natural resources rents and growth overtime and by countries. Another advantage associated 
to the PSTR approach is that it permits a smooth and/or a brutal change in country-specific 
correlation depending on the threshold variables. In this paper, our threshold variables are the 
different indicators of institutional quality. They include the rule of law, regulatory quality, 
governance effectiveness, political stability, control of corruption and voice and 
accountability, respectively.  
 
Nonetheless the PSTR also has some disadvantages. First, the PSTR does not solve the 
problem of endogenous variable found among the explanatory variables. Second, the PSTR 
assumes a unique threshold for all the countries. To check for potential endogeneity, we also 
run estimates using the instrumental variable approach and check for endogeneity of the 
indicators of institutional quality using instruments suggested by Moshiri and Hayati (2017). 
 
To investigate the non-linear relationship between natural resources rents and economic, we 
use a PSTR approach developed by González et al. (2005), which is a generalization of the 
Hansen (1999) Panel Threshold Regression model. Let the basic panel smooth transition 
regression model with two regimes be expressed as: 
 
        
 
 
     
 
 
                                                                                             (1)   
 
where i=1,...,N, and  t=1,...,T, with N and T denoting the cross section and time dimensions of 
the panel,    the dependent variable,     a k-dimensional vector of time varying exogenous 
variables,    the fixed individual effect,      the error term and c a threshold parameter.  
 
The transition function            is a continuous function and depends on the threshold 
variable     (Hansen, 1999). Granger and Tarasvirta (1993) provide a logistic specification of 
the transition function with c  denoting threshold parameters,     determines the smoothness or 
slope of the transition,     the threshold variable and m the number of thresholds.  
The PSTR model has the advantage of computing heterogeneity between countries through 
the estimation of the respective marginal effects for each country. The marginal effect reflects 
observed variations caused by changes in the threshold variable    . Re-writing equation 1 in 
the form of the empirical model adopted for the PSTR in this paper, we obtain: 
 
                                                                 
                                                                                   (2) 
 
where GDPG represents growth is gross domestic product; NR natural resources (total natural 
resources rent and the percentage of ores and metal export to total export); INFL inflation; 
OPT openness to trade; INVS investment; POPG population growth; IQ institutional quality 
(rule of law, Regulatory quality, governance effectiveness, Control of corruption, political 
stability and voice and accountability); HC Human Capital and IGDP the initial level of GDP 
per capita. The transition function is              . 
 
As earlier indicated, one of the shortcomings of the PSTR is that it does check for 
endogeneity. To circumvent this problem, we first perform an instrumental variables 
regression to account for endogeneity for cross-sectional data. For the cross-sectional data, we 
consider the average values between the period 1996-2016 for the variables reported in 
equation 3.  Furthermore, using the same structural model we estimate a system dynamic 
panel data with instrumental variables.  The equation is presented in equation 3 as: 
 
                                                               
                        
                                                                                           (3) 
 
where the different variables similar to those used in equation (2) are reported as their average 
values. The term            
  both captures the joint effect of natural resources and 
institutional quality and the non-linear effect of this joint effect on growth.  By estimating 
equation 3 for cross-sectional and panel data, we control for endogeneity.  
 
Estimating equation 3 requires we instrumented for institutional quality to verify it 
exogeneity. The expression of the reduced form equation for institutional quality considering 
the three instruments is expressed in equation 4. 
 
                                                   (4) 
 
where, IM represents incidence of malaria, LT represents latitude and OF represents official 
language.   
 
III.2. Model specification tests adopted for this study 
 
Gonzalez et al. (2005) suggest two steps in undertaking a PSTR. First, we test for linearity 
and second, we estimate the parameters. 
 
III.2.1. Testing for linearity 
 
Testing for linearity of the PSTR model indicated by equation (1) can be undertaken either by 
testing                      In both cases, the test will be non-standard because under 
the null hypothesis, the PSTR model contains unidentified nuisance parameters. To 
circumvent the identification problem, we replace the transition function (          ) by its 
first order Taylor expansion around      (see Luukkonen et al., 1988).  
Consequently, testing          is equivalent in testing        
      
    in equation 
(2). This null hypothesis may be conveniently tested by a Wald test (LM), the Pseudo 
likelihood ratio test (LRT) and the Lagrange Multiplier of Fisher (LMF).  
 
Two comments can be made concerning the linearity tests. First, the test can be used for 
selecting the appropriate transition variable     in the PSTR model. Second, the linearity test 
can also be used to determine the appropriate order m of the logistic function. Granger and 
Terasvirta (1993) propose a series of test to choose between m=1 and m=2 number of 
transitions. Using a regression with m=3, test the null hypothesis   
     
    
    
     If 
the first scenario for three transitions (m=3) is rejected, we then test for two and one 
transitions expressed as    
      
       
     
        
    and    
     
      
    
    
in a stepwise manner. Select m=2 if the rejection    
  is strongest one, otherwise select m=1 if 
the rejection    
  appears to be the strongest. 
 
III.2.2. Parameter estimations 
 
The parameters               in equation (1) are estimated in two steps. We first eliminate 
the individual effects    by removing individual-specific averages. Second, we apply the 
nonlinear least square method to the transformed data to determine the values of parameters 
that minimize the concentrated sum of squared errors expressed as   . While estimating the 
PSTR model, a practical issue that deserves some attention is how to select the starting values 
for     and  , that represents the degree of smoothness of the transition associated to the 
regime change and the m-dimensional vector of location parameters such that           
                       j = 1....,m. The values minimizing the function representing the 
concentrated sum of squared error (       ) can be used as starting values of the nonlinear 
optimization algorithm. 
 
III.3. Data 
 
Data used in this study is generated from the 2018 World Bank Development Indicator 
(World Bank, 2018a) and 2018 Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) of the World Bank 
(World Bank, 2018b). In this study, we adopt two variables to proxy natural resources. The 
first proxy is natural resource rents
2
 as a percentage of GDP. The second proxy is the 
percentage of ores and metal exports to total merchandise export. These two variables are 
chosen rather than natural resource reserves that report the measured stock of natural 
resources. We argue for this choice because, a given country may be rich in resources reserve 
but her revenues not being directly drawn from natural resource exploitations because she is 
yet to exploit these resources. This is clearly not the reported situation for countries of African 
countries because significant shares of their revenues are gotten from natural resource 
exploitation. Furthermore, it is difficult to report whether the stock of natural resources has 
the same effect on economic growth as either natural resource rents or the share of ores and 
metal of total export. We use the two proxies mentioned above to also verify whether the 
relationship between natural resources may depend on the type of measure of natural 
resources.  Values for natural resource rents and ores and metal exports reported in this study 
are computed from the World Bank development indicator report. Nonetheless, we 
acknowledge that natural resources rent measure may be subjected to price volatility and 
technological changes, and can be affected by the production cost across countries. 
 
Regarding the indicators of institutional quality, we adopt six variables. They include the rule 
of law (RL), regulatory quality (RQ), governance effectiveness (GE), control of corruption 
(CC), political stability (PS) and voice and accountability (VA) published in the 2018 WGI 
(World Bank, 2018b, Kaufman, 2010).  
 
Other related economic variables we use in this study are also obtained from the 2018 World 
Bank development indicator report. They include growth in gross domestic product (GDPG), 
inflation (INFL) defined as the annual percentage of consumer price index, trade openness 
(OPT) measured as efforts by a country to either restrict or invite trade between countries and 
calculated by the ratio of the sum of export of goods and services plus import of goods and 
services to GDP, investment (INVS), measured as the percentage of the gross fixed capital 
formation to GDP, population growth rate (POPG) defined as the annual growth rate of the 
total population, human capital (HC) measured as the rate secondary school enrollment and 
initial level of GDP per capita  (IGDP) which is the log of ten years lag of the GDP per capita.  
The IGDP enables us to determine if there is a convergence process between the 44 countries 
that constitute our panel data. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1A in the annex. 
 
IV.  Empirical results 
IV.1. Results for stationarity test, nonlinearity test, test for number of threshold and 
endogeneity test 
 
The different procedures associated with specifying the PSTR rely on the assumption that all 
variables are stationary. Table 2A in the appendix shows stationarity results estimated using 
the test elaborated by Im et al. (2003). Results indicate that all the variables are stationary and 
                                                          
2
 Natural resource rents are defined in this study as the difference obtained from the total revenue that can be 
generated from the extraction of the natural resource minus the cost of extracting these resources (plus normal 
return on investment reported by extractive enterprises). This is the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents 
(hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents. 
significant. After testing for stationarity, we also test for linearity because the PSTR is 
applicable to nonlinear variables. The different tests
3
 for linearity vs PSTR with m*=2 
indicate that the null hypothesis of linearity for the model (                   ) is 
rejected at 1%. The model is therefore nonlinear. This indicates that for each regression we 
have a maximum of two regimes. 
 
We test for the endogeneity
4
 of the indicators of institutional quality. In other to address this 
issue, we perform an endogeneity test by Durbin-Wu-Hausman. The null hypothesis purports 
that the variables for institutional quality are exogenous and the alternative hypothesis that 
they are endogenous. Rejecting the alternative hypothesis for each variable reflecting 
institutional quality would indicate that the said variable is exogenous. Following Moshiri and 
Hayati (2017) we use conventional instruments found in the literature to verify if the variables 
for institutional quality are exogenous. Instruments used for the endogeneity test are the 
incidence of malaria in a given country (Acemoglu et al., 2000) and the official language 
spoken in the country (Hall and Jones, 1999) and the latitude of (Hall and Jones, 1999; 
Easterly and Levine, 2016). Table 1 present the endogeneity test for the six variables used in 
this study as our institutional quality variable.  
 
Please insert Table 1 here 
 
Using instrumental variable approach, the results in Table 1 suggests that all the six indicators 
of the institutional quality are exogenous because we reject the alternative hypothesis of 
endogeneity. These results are also obtained by Moshiri and Hayati (2017) using the same 
indicators on a cross-sectional sample of 149 endowed natural resources countries. 
Furthermore, Table 3A in the appendix reports results for both the Sargan and Basman tests 
for overidentification. These statistics indicate that the instruments are valid as all the p-
values are greater than 0.05.  
 
IV.2. Estimations result  
 
In this section, we comment in a stepwise manner results from the cross-section instrumental 
variable estimations (4.2.1), a system dynamic panel-data instrumental variable estimation 
(4.2.2) and the Panel threshold estimation (4.2.3) for the two variables used to study natural 
resources and the six indicators of institutional quality.  
 
IV.2.1. Cross-section instrumental variable estimations of natural resource rents on 
economic growth  
 
                                                          
3
 The various tests of linearity vs PSTR model for all the 14 PSTR regressions computed in this study are 
provided by the authors upon request. 
4
 Green (2012) suggests that we can examine endogeneity of a variable by estimating a single equation. 
Moreover, if the F statistics of the IV variable in the first regression is less than 10 then the instruments are 
week.  
Although results from the endogeneity test indicate that all the six indicators of institutional 
are exogenous, it is necessary to estimate an IV regression for robustness check.  Using cross-
sectional data for 44 African countries, Table 2 post IV estimates for the model outlined in 
equation 3 for natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP (Col.1 to Col.6) and the share of 
ores and metal exports to total export (Col.7 to Col.12). We run this regression for the six 
indicators of institutional quality because we suggest that effect on natural resources on 
economic growth may be sensitive to the choice of the indicator used to capture institutional 
quality.  
 
Concerning the percentage of natural resource rent to GDP, Table 2 indicates that the direct 
effect of natural resources on economic growth is positive and significant when we consider 
rule of law (Col.1) and governance effectiveness (Col.4). Looking at the joint effect ((Natural 
resources rent as % GDP *IQ)
2
) the values were negative for all six indicators of institutional 
quality though not significant. This switch in signs may be indicating non-linearity.  
 
On the other hand, results for the share of ores and metal to total export show no significant 
direct effect with growth in GDP when we undertake a cross-sectional instrumental variable 
estimate. Regarding the combined effect, the interaction between the percentage of ores and 
metals of total export and the indicator for institutional quality was positive and significant 
only for model which included control of corruption (Table 2, Col.8). The switch of signs also 
purports the presence on a non-linear relationship between natural resources and growth.   
 
An analysis of some other covariates indicate that human capital related positively and 
significantly for the models which controlled for the rule of law, political stability, 
governance effectiveness and voice and accountability when we consider the share of natural 
resource rents to GDP. For the share ores and metal exports of total export, we observe a 
positive and significant relations for all six models of the different institutional quality 
indicators. Concerning the variable investments, the relationship was positive and significant 
for the variables rule of law, corruption, political stability and voice and accountability when 
considering the percentage of natural resource rent of GDP. For estimates using the of the 
share of ores and metals export of total export, the relationship was significantly positive for 
all six indicators of institutional quality (Table 2, Col.7-Col.12). Trade openness post positive 
and significant results for rule of law; political stability and government effectiveness for the 
share of natural resource rents to GDP and rule of law, political stability and voice and 
accountability for ores and metal percentage of total export. 
 
Please insert Table 2 here 
 
IV.2.2. System dynamic panel-data instrumental variable estimation for natural resource 
rents on economic growth  
 
Table 3 reports a system dynamic panel data estimates for the two different measures of 
natural resources. We undertake this analysis because results obtained from the cross-
sectional section Instrumental Variables estimations may be less effective. The cross-sectional 
data for the 44 African countries is constructed by attributing the average values of the 
variables used in our analysis over the period 1996-2016. For robustness check, we therefore 
propose to undertake a system dynamic panel data estimate which accounts for endogeneity. 
The panel data used for this process takes into consideration both the individual dimension 
and the time dimension to estimate the model suggested in equation 5.  
 
Table 3 indicates that when we consider the percentage of natural resource rent to GDP (Table 
3, Col.1-Col.6), the direct effect of natural resources rent on economic growth is negative and 
significant for the indicators rule of law (Col.1), control of corruption (Col.2), regulatory 
quality (Col.5) and voice and accountability (Col.6). This result is similar to results obtained 
by Bjorvant and Farzanengan (2013), Avom and Carmignani (2010) and Nuno et al., (2009). 
In resource rich countries, tradable production that focuses on the natural resources sector 
rather than other manufacturing sectors (Sach and Warner, 1995) and declining prices of raw 
materials (Singer, 1950) explain this negative relationship. In the case of African countries, 
we observe a combined effect of both explanations where little diversification of their 
economy is coupled with falling world prices of natural resources. The ensuing effect is a 
reduction in income from natural resources that could be channeled towards investment 
projects causing growth. This negative effect for the region is that resource rents crowd out 
the manufacturing sector, adversely affecting growth and hampering efforts by countries to 
structurally transform their economies.  
 
Furthermore, the interaction effect of natural resources and indicators of institutional quality 
are positive and significant for rule of law (Col.1), control of corruption (Col.2) and voice and 
accountability (Col.6). This indicates a priori that better rule of law, less corruption or rent 
seeking behaviors and more accountability mitigate the negative relationship between natural 
resources and economic growth. We also observe that the change in sign indicates a non-
linear relationship between natural resources and economic growth as argued in this paper. 
 
Considering the percentage of ore and metal exports of total export, results suggests that 
natural resource has a positive and significant effect when we control for and political 
stability (Table 3, Col.9) and Governance effective (Table 3, Col.10). The interaction effect 
reveals a negative and significant relationship for political stability (Col.9) and governance 
effectiveness (Col.10); but positive and significant relationship for voice and accountability 
(Col. 12). Damette and Seghir (2018) also found a negative interaction between oil revenue 
and governance effectiveness in oil exporting countries.  
 
Please insert Table 3 here 
 
An analysis of other covariates indicate that inflation was negative and significant when we 
control for all six indicators of institutional quality for natural resource rent as a percentage of 
GDP (Table 3, Col.1-Col.6). This relationship was positive and significant for rule of law 
(Col.7) and regulation quality (Col.11) for the share of ores and metals to total export. The 
variable population growth was positive and significant when we controlled for institutional 
quality for estimates using natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP. For human capital, 
we observe a negative and significant relationship for all six institutional variables when 
considering the percentage of ores and metal exports of total export. This observation was 
only valid for control of corruption as well as voice and accountability for estimates using 
natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP. The variable trade openness was negative and 
significant only for estimate for the percentage of ores and metal exports of total export when 
we consider each of the six variables for institutional quality.  
 
IV.2.3. Panel Threshold estimations for natural resource rents on economic growth  
 
Results from Tables 2 and 3 suggest the presence on a non-linear relationship between natural 
resources and economic growth. This is evident because the signs of coefficient for both the 
percentage of natural resource rents in GDP and the share of ores and metals to total export 
change when we interact these variables with the indicators of institutional quality. In 
addition, neither the cross-sectional instrumental variable approach nor the system dynamic 
panel-data estimates instrumental variable estimation techniques are not effective in analyzing 
the non-linear effect of natural resources on growth. We therefore suggest to use panel smooth 
transition regression approach which deals with non-linear approach using institutional 
quality as threshold variable. 
 
Table 4 shows estimated results of our empirical model outlined in equation 4. It presents the 
regression results for the two scenarios outlined in the methodology. In the first scenario, the 
coefficients associated to    indicate estimated results when we do not include the threshold 
variable (the different indicators of institutional quality) in the PSTR model. In the second 
scenario, the coefficients associated to   indicate the estimated results when we include the 
threshold variable in the PSTR. Table 4 also reports the results of the estimated threshold 
variable (  )  and the estimated slope parameters (   using for each indicator of institutional 
quality chosen as the threshold variable. 
 
Considering the first scenario, the relationship between natural resources and economic 
growth is not significant albeit being negative when we control for rule of law and 
government effectiveness and positive for control of corruption, regulatory quality and voice 
and accountability in the case where we consider the percentage of natural resource rents on 
GDP (Table 4, Col.1-Col.5).  Brunnshweiler and Bulte (2008a; 2008b) find similar results and 
suggest the non-significance of natural resources (natural capital) due to potential 
endogeneity. 
 
Please insert Table 4 here 
 
When we consider the second scenario, for which we introduce the threshold variables for 
institutional quality in regression model, the relationship between natural resource rents and 
economic growth becomes positive and significant when we control for rule of law (Col.1), 
control of corruption (Col.2) and regulatory quality (Col.4). This indicates that institutions 
that fight corruption, enforce the rule of law of adopt quality regulation ameliorates the 
neutral relationship between natural resource rents and economic growth. This amelioration 
takes place when these institutions do not have competing interests with producers or 
production in the natural resource sector. Furthermore, transitioning from the from the first 
regime to the second regime is smooth as indicated by the smooth transition function in the 
PSTR model.  
 
These findings are similar to results obtained by Mehlum et al. (2006a and b), Sala-i-Martin 
and Subramanian (2013) and Belarbi et al. (2016). Consequently, strong and accountable 
institutions that have transparent policies should prevent malpractices by actors in the natural 
resource sector and therefore encourage adequate utilization of resources from this sector to 
consolidate development in African countries. According to Claessens and Laeven (2003), if 
institutional quality is strong, then revenues from natural resource sectors should boost 
economic development, through better property right that tend to improve asset allocation 
which favors the growth process through structural transformation.  
 
We also comment on the first and second scenarios for estimates obtained when we consider 
the share of ores and metal of total export, controlling for the different variables of 
institutional quality. The first scenario which do not include threshold variable suggest a 
negative and significant effect when considering rule of law (Table 4, Col.6) and regulatory 
quality (Table 4, Col.9); and a positive and significant effect when we control for corruption 
(Col.7) and voice and accountability (Col.10). For the negative and significant effect, similar 
results are obtained by Ndjokou and Tsopmo (2017) as well as Claudio and Gregorio (2005). 
When we include institutional quality as threshold variable, we observe a swap in signs as this 
relationship becomes positive when we control for the rule of law and regulatory quality and 
negative for corruption and voice and accountability. For these effects, we attribute to a 
change in regime across the transition function.   
 
Considering other covariates, Table 4 reports different results for the indicators of institutional 
quality and the measures for natural resources. Regarding the variable natural resource rents 
as a percentage of GDP, we find a positive relationship between the share of gross fixed 
capital formation to GDP and economic growth when controlling for rule of law and negative 
relationship when controlling for governance effectiveness. For the second scenario, these 
results swap signs. On the contrary when we consider shares of ores and metal to total export 
the relationship between investment and economic growth was positive for indicators of 
institutional quality in the first scenario and negative when we control for political stability 
and regulation and quality.  
 
Concerning the variable inflation, this relationship was negative and significant for rule of law 
but positive for corruption and government effectiveness in the first scenario considering 
natural resource rents. For the second scenario, the relationship was negative for corruption 
and governance. However, estimates using the share ores and metals to total export report that 
the relationship between inflation was negative when controlling for rule of law, corruption, 
political stability and regulations. Introducing the threshold variables, this relationship was 
positive for these indicators of institutional quality.  
 
Human capital was negative and significant for the controlled variables rule of law, corruption 
as well as regulation and quality when we consider natural resource rents as a percentage of 
GDP. For the share ores and metal in total export this relationship was negative and 
significant when we control for rule of law, political stability and regulation and quality. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This study analyzed the role of institutions in ameliorating the relationship between natural 
resources and economic growth using a panel-data of 44 African countries over the period 
1996-2016. Natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP and the share of ores and metals to 
total merchandise export are used to measure natural resources. For institutional quality, we 
use six indicators. They include the rule of law (RL), regulatory quality (RQ), governance 
effectiveness (GE), control of corruption (CC), political stability (PS) and voice and 
accountability (VA). 
 
Furthermore, in a stepwise manner we undertake a cross-sectional instrumental variable 
analysis and a system dynamic panel-data instrumental variable regression to successively 
verify for potential endogeneity of the indicators of institutional quality. In addition, we also 
use a panel smooth transition regression, to test the non-linear relationship between natural 
resources and economic growth and heterogeneity. 
 
Instrumenting for each of the six indicators of institutional quality as suggested by Moshiri 
and Hayati (2017), results indicate that all six indicators are exogenous. We also observe a 
nonlinear relationship between natural resources and economic growth. Results from the 
cross-sectional instrumental variable analysis and the system dynamic panel-data instrumental 
variable regression indicate that effect of natural resources on economic growth for panel of 
44 African countries could be contingent on (1) the measure of natural resources, (2) the 
choice of the indicator of institutional quality, (3) the nature of the model specification and (4) 
the methodology adopted. There is need to adequately chose the measure of both natural 
resources and institutions as well as model specification or methodology when addressing 
questions on natural resources curse in an African context.   
 
Estimates for the PSTR model which argue for a non-linear relationship between natural 
resources and growth indicate different results when we consider the two measures of natural 
resources and control for the six indicators of institutional quality. When consider natural 
resource rents as percentage of GDP, we observe no significant effect on growth when 
controlling for all the indicators of institutional quality. Nonetheless, we observe a positive 
and significant effect of natural resource on growth when we introduce the threshold variable 
for institutional quality for the indicators reflecting the rule of law, control of corruption and 
governance effectiveness. This indicates that there is a threshold for which these institutional 
variables ameliorate the non-significant effect of natural resources on growth. 
 
Concerning the share of ores and metal of total export we find different results based on the 
indicator for institutional quality. Results for the PSTR which do not include threshold 
variable suggest a negative and significant effect when considering rule of law and regulatory 
quality and a positive and significant effect when we control for corruption and voice and 
accountability. When we include institutional quality as threshold variable, we observe a swap 
in signs as this relationship becomes positive when we control for the rule of law and 
regulatory quality and negative for corruption and voice and accountability. For these effects, 
we attribute to a change in regime across the transition function.   
 
In closing, we purport that it is difficult to generalize the finding that institutions ameliorate 
the relationship between natural resource rents and economic growth for all six indicators of 
institutional quality. This is because the extent and role on institutions vary for indicators of 
institutional quality as well as the variable used to reflect natural resources. Nonetheless, the 
non-linear relationship between natural resources and economic growth is significantly 
ameliorate when we consider the variables rule of law and regulations and quality for both 
natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP and the share of ores and metals to total export.  
 
This should suggest that if priority was to be given to any of the six indicators of institutional 
quality, these two variables should be considered as priorities in designing policy that 
ameliorate natural resource management and its effect on economic growth.  
 
References 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson,S., and Robinson, J. (2003). “An African Success Story: Botswana,” 
In D. Rodrik(ed.), Search of Prosperity: Analytical Narrative on Economic Growth, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, pp. 80-122. 
African Development Bank Group. (2014). African Economic Outlook 2014. African 
Development Bank Group, 2014. 
Atkison, G. and K., Hamilton. (2003). “Saving, Growth and the Resources Curse 
Hypothesis,” World Development, Vol. 31, No. 11, pp. 1793-1807. 
Avom, D. et F. Carmignani (2010). «L’Afrique Centrale peut-elle Eviter le Piège de la 
Malédiction des Produits de Base?,» Revue d'Economie du Développement, Vol. 18, pp. 
47-72. 
Arezki, R. and F., Van der Ploeg. (2007). “Can the Natural Resource Curse be turned into a 
Blessing?: The Role of Trade Policies and Institutions,” IMF Working Paper, No. 55. 
IMF, Washington, D.C. 
Auty, R.M. (1993). Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The resource curse 
Thesis. Routledge, London. 
Auty, R.M. (2001). Resource Abundance and Economic Development. New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2001. 
Belarbi, Y., Lylia, S. and S., Said. (2015). “Effects of Institutions and Natural Resources in a 
Multiple Growth Regime,” Working Paper, The Economic Research Forum (ERF) 2, 
Al-Sad Al-Aaly Street Dokki, Giza. 
Bhattacharya, S. and R., Hodder (2010). “Natural Resources, Democracy and Corruption,” 
European Economic Review, Vol. 54, pp. 608-621. 
Bjorvant, K. and M.R., Farzanengan. (2013). “Demographic Transition in Resource Rich 
Countries: A Blessing or Curse,” World Development, Vol. 45, pp. 337-351. 
Boschini, A., Patterson, J. and J., Ronie. (2013). “The Resource Curse and its Potential 
Reversal,” World Development, Vol. 43, pp. 19-41. 
Bulte, E., Damania, R. and R., Deacon. (2005). “Resource Intensity, Institutions and 
Development,” World Development, Vol. 33, No.7, pp. 1029–1044. 
Claessens, S. and L., Laeven. (2003). “Financial Development, Property Rights and Growth,” 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 58, No. 6, pp. 2401–2436. 
Claudio, B. and J., Gregorio. (2005). “The Relative Richness of the Poor? Natural Resources, 
Human capital and Economic growth,” Working paper, No. 139, Central Bank of Chile. 
Collier, P. and A., Hoeffler. (2005). “Resource rents, Governance, and Conflict,” The Journal 
of Conflit Resolution, Vol. 49, pp. 625- 633. 
Collier P. and A., Hoeffler. (2009). “Testing the Neocon Agenda: Democracy in Resource-
Rich Societies,” European Economic Review, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 293-308. 
Dalgaard, C.J. and O., Olsson. (2008). “Windfall Gains, Political Economy and Economic 
Development”, Journal of African Economies, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 72-109. 
Damette, O. and M., Seghir. (2018). “Natural resource curse in oil exporting countries: A 
nonlinear approach,” International Economics, CEPII research center, No. 156, pp. 231-
246. 
Diaw, D. and A., Lessoua. (2013). “Natural Resource Exports, Diversification and Economic 
Growth of CEMAC Countries: On the Impact of Trade with China,” African 
Development Review, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 189-202. 
Dunning, T. (2008). Crude Democracy. Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes, New 
York, Cambridge University Press. 
Easterly, W. and R., Levine. (2003). “Tropics, Germs and Crops: How Endowment Influence 
Economic Development,” Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 3-39. 
Easterly, W. and R., Levine. (2016). “The European Origins of Economic Development,” 
Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 21, pp. 225–57. 
El Anshashy, A. and M.S., Katshaiti. (2013). “Natural Resources and Fiscal Performance: 
Does Good Governance Matter,” Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 37, pp. 285-298. 
Gylfason T. (2001). “Natural Resources, Education, and Economic Development,” European 
Economic Review, Vol. 45, No. 4-6, pp. 847-859. 
Glyfason, T., T., Herbertsson and G., Zeoga. (1999). “A Mixed Blessing: Natural Resources 
and Economic Growth,” Macroeconomics Dynamics, Vol. 3, pp. 204 -225. 
Glyfason, T. and G., Zeoga. (2001). “Natural Resources and Economic Growth: The Role of 
Investment,” CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2743. 
Gonzalez, A., Terasvirta, T., and D., Van. (2005). “Panel Smooth Transition Regression 
Model,” SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, N° 60. 
Granger, C. and T., Teräsvirta (1993). Modeling Nonlinear Economic Relationships. Oxford 
University Press. 
Haber, S. and V., Menaldo. (2011). “Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A 
Reappraisal of the Resource Curse,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 105, pp. 
1-26. 
Hall, R. and C., Jones. (1999). “Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per 
Worker than Others?,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 11, No. 4(1), pp. 83-116. 
Hansen, B. (1999). “Threshold Effects in Non-Dynamic Panels: Estimation, Testing and 
Inference,” Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 93, No. 2, pp. 345-368. 
Im, K.S., M.H., Pesaran and Y., Shin (2003). “Testing for Unit roots in Heterogeneous 
Panels,” Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 115, pp. 53–74. 
Joya, O. (2015). “Growth and Volatility in Resource-Rich Countries: Does Diversification 
help?,” Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Vol. 35, pp. 38-55. 
Kaufman, D., A., Kraay and M. Mastruzzi (2010). “The World Governance Indicators: 
Methodology and Analytical Issues,” Global Economy and Development, Brooking 
Institutes. 
Lalji N. (2007). “The Resource Curse Revised: Conflict and Coltan in the Congo,” Harvard 
International Review, Vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 34-38.  
Larsen R.E. (2004). “Escaping the Resource Curse and the Dutch Disease? When and why 
Norway Caught Up with and Forged Ahead of Its Neighbours,” Discussion Paper No. 
377, Statistics Norway, Oslo. 
Le Billon P. (2008). “Diamond wars? Conflict Diamonds and Geographies of Resource 
Wars,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, VoL. 98, No. 2, pp.345-
372. 
Leite, C.A. and J., Weidmann. (1999). “Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources 
Corruption, and Economic Growth,” IMF Working Papers No. 99/85. 
Luukkonen, R., P. Saikokonen and T., Terävirta. (1988). “Testing Linearity against Smooth 
Transition Autoregressive Models,” Biometrica, Vol. 75, pp. 491- 499. 
Lucas, R. (1988) “On the Mechanism of Economic Development,” Journal of Monetary           
Economics, Vol. 22, pp. 2-42. 
Maiti D. (2009). “Institutions, Networks and Industrialization: Field level Evidence of 
Fragmentation and Flexibility from India,” IIPG Discussion Papers No. 26, Research 
Program Consortium for Improving Institutions for Pro-Poor Growth. 
Mavrotas, G., Murshed, S.M. and S., Torres. (2011). “Natural Resources Dependence and 
Economic Performance in the 1970-200 Period,” Review of Development Economics, 
Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 124-138. 
Mankiw, N.G., D., Romer, and D.N., Weil. (1992). “A Contribution to the Empirics of 
Economics Growth,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 107, pp. 407-437. 
Mehlum, H., K., Moene and R., Torviks. (2006b). “Institutions and the Resource Curse,” The 
Economic Journal, Vol. 116, No. 508, pp. 1-20. 
Mehlum, H., K.O., Moene and R., Torvik. (2006a). “Cursed by Resources or Institutions?,” 
World Economy, Vol. 29, No. 8., pp. 1117-1131. 
Moshiri, S. and S., Hayati. (2017). “Natural Resources, Institution Quality, and Economic 
Growth,” Iranian Economic Review, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 661-693. 
Murshed, M. (2003). “When does Natural resource abundance lead to a Resource Curse?,” 
Mimeo, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague. 
Ndjokou, I.M.M.M and P.C., Tsopmo. (2017). “The Effects on Economic Growth of Natural 
Resources in Sub-Saharan Africa: Does the Quality of Institutions Matters?,” 
Economics Bulletin, vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 248-263. 
Nuno, T., Óscar, A. and S., Isabel. (2009). “Natural Resources, Economic Growth and 
Institutions: A Panel approach,” FEP Working Papers 338, Universidade do Porto. 
Olsson O. (2007). “Conflict Diamonds,” Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 82, No. 2, 
pp. 267-286. 
Omgba, L. D. (2010). Trois Essais sur l’Economie Politique de la Rente Pétrolière dans les 
Etats africains. Thèse Nouveau Régime, Université d’Auvergne-Clermont-Ferrand I. 
Robinson, J.A., Torvik, R. and T., Verdier. (2006). “Political Foundations of the Resource 
Curse,” Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 79, No. 2, pp. 447-468. 
Ross, M.L. (2001). “Does Oil Hinder Democracy,” World Politics, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 325-
361. 
Sachs, J. and A., Warner. (1997). “Source of Slow Growth in African Economies,” Journal of 
African economies, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 335-76. 
Sachs, J. and A., Warner. (1995). “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth,” In 
G., Meier and J., Rauch (eds.), Leading Issues in Economic Development, Oxford 
University Press, New York. 
Sachs, J. and A., Warner. (1999). “The Big Push, Natural Resource Booms and Growth,” 
Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 59, No. 1, pp. 43-76. 
Sachs, J. and A., Warner. (2001). “The Curse of Natural Resources,” European Economic 
Review, Vol. 45, No. 4-6., pp. 827-838. 
Sala-i-Martin, X and A., Subramanian. (2013). “Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An 
Illustration from Nigeria,” Journal of African Economies, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 570-615. 
Singer, H.W. (1950). “The Distribution of Trade between Investing and Borrowing 
Countries,” American Economic Review, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp 473-85. 
Solow, R.M. (1956). “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 71, pp. 65–94. 
Terasvirta, T. (1994). “Specification, Estimation and Evaluation of Smooth Transition 
Autoregressive Models,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 89, No. 
425, pp. 208-218. 
Tsani, S. (2013). “Natural Resource, Governance and Institutional Quality: The Role of 
Resource Funds,” Resources Policy, Vol. 38, pp. 181-195. 
Toto Same A. (2008). “Mineral-Rich Countries and Dutch Disease: Understanding the 
Macroeconomic Implications of Windfalls and the Development Prospects. The Case 
of Equatorial Guinea,” Policy Research Working Paper No. 4595, World Bank.  
Van der Ploeg, F. and S., Poelhekke. (2009). “The Volatility Curse: Revisiting the Paradox of 
Plenty,” DNB Working Papers No. 206, Netherlands Central Bank, Research 
Department. 
Wantchekon, L. (2002). “Why Do Resource Dependent Countries Have Authoritarian 
Governments?,” Journal of African Finance and Economic Development, Vol. 5, No. 
2, pp.57-77. 
World Bank. (2018a). World Development indicator 2014. Washington DC: World Bank. 
Washington D.C. 
World Bank (2018b). Worldwide Governance indicator 2014, Washington DC: World Bank. 
Washington D.C. 
 
Appendix 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Test for Institutional Quality Endogeneity   
Variables Durbin scores test chi2[1] Wu-Hausman F [Fisher (1, 4)] 
Rule of law 0.915 [p=0.338] 0.870 [p=0.356] 
Regulatory quality 0.416 [p=0.518] 0.391 [p=0.534] 
Control of corruption 2.486 [p=0.114] 2.455 [p=0.124] 
Governance effectiveness 4.490 [p=0.114] 2.460 [p=0.124] 
Voice and accountability 0.041 [p=0.839] 0.038 [p=0.845] 
Political stability 2.370 [p=0.123] 2.334 [p=0.134] 
Source: Computed by authors from WDI 2018 and the WGI 2018.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Cross-section Instrumental Variables estimation of natural resource on economic growth. Dependent variable GDP growth rates   
Variables Estimates for share of natural resource rents to GDP Estimates for share of ores and metal of total export 
 
 
Model 1 
RL 
Col.1 
Model 2 
CC 
Col.2 
Model 3 
PS 
Col.3 
Model 4 
GE 
Col.4 
Model 5 
RQ 
Col.5 
Model 6 
VA 
Col.6 
Model 1 
RL 
Col.7 
Model 2 
CC 
Col.8 
Model 3 
PS 
Col.9 
Model 4 
GE 
Col.10 
Model 5 
RQ 
Col.11 
Model 6 
VA 
Col.12 
Natural resources rent 
% GDP 
0.406** 
(0.200) 
0.409 
(0.225) 
0.257 
(0.163) 
0.380** 
(0.194) 
0.868 
(0.825) 
0.280 
(0.228) 
      
(Natural resources rent 
% GDP *IQ)2 
-0.006 
(0.003) 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.012 
(0.11) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
      
Ores and metal export % of total 
export 
      0.015 
(0.072) 
-0.205 
(0.125) 
-0.003 
(0.034) 
-0.221 
(0.150) 
-0.184 
(0.135) 
0.048 
(0.038) 
(Ores and metal export % of total 
export *IQ)2 
      0.001 
(0.004) 
0.013* 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.018 
(0.011) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
Inflation 
 
0.032 
(0.019) 
0.031* 
(0.018) 
0.006 
(0.012) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.018 
(0.018) 
0.015 
0.010) 
0.013 
(0.008) 
0.012 
(0.011) 
0.014 
(0.008) 
0.012 
(0.0125) 
0.014 
(0.10) 
0.012 
(0.007) 
Population growth 1.001 
(0.852) 
1.246 
(0.856) 
0.999 
(1.271) 
1.559 
(0.980) 
-0.485 
(2.367) 
0.101 
(1.1229 
1.565* 
(0.876) 
6.065** 
(0.993) 
1.624** 
(0.841) 
2.129 
(1.084) 
2.116** 
(1.016) 
1.347 
(0.850) 
Human capital 0.0497* 
(0.0285) 
0.029 
(0.243) 
0.062** 
(0.30) 
0.073** 
(0.030) 
0.1113 
(0.086) 
0.034* 
(0.019) 
0.0585** 
(0.031) 
0.101** 
(0.072) 
0.072** 
(0.033) 
0.103** 
(0.0448) 
0.089** 
(0.037) 
0.046* 
(0.027) 
Investment 0.117** 
(0.0958) 
0.211*** 
(0.0596) 
0.177** 
(0.077) 
0.105 
(10.105 
-0.058 
(0.339) 
0.285*** 
(0.434 
0.226*** 
(0.059) 
0.226** 
(0.072) 
0.232*** 
(0.053) 
0.241*** 
(0.071) 
0.238*** 
(0.067) 
0.226*** 
(0.062) 
Trade openness 0.055* 
(0.0318) 
0.037 
(0.256) 
0.036** 
(0.021) 
0.060* 
(0.034) 
0.081 
(0.077) 
0.004 
(0.016) 
0.026** 
(0.013) 
0.018 
(0.016) 
0.028*** 
(0.012) 
0.015 
(0.017) 
0.0149 
(0.016) 
0.028** 
(0.013) 
Initial level of GDP per capita -1.936** 
(0.881) 
-0.440 
(1.182) 
-3.099** 
(1.393) 
-2.095*** 
(0.773) 
-2.638 
(1.799) 
0.610 
(1.099) 
-1.628** 
(0.651) 
-1.446 
(0.9924) 
-1.783** 
(0.586) 
-1.598* 
(0.933) 
-1.101 
0.897 
-1.755** 
(0.583) 
Constant 3.426 
(6.435) 
-7.138 
(10.457) 
12.534 
(10.271) 
2.528 
(5.615) 
6.961 
(10.752) 
-1.566 
(7.852) 
2.715 
(5.918) 
-0.524 
(7.265) 
2.642 
(5.233) 
0.359 
(7.127) 
-2.590 
(7.381) 
4.391 
(5.241) 
R2 0.266 0.358 - 0.443  0.475 0.641 - 0.431 - - - 
Wald chi (2) 218 173 43.52 226.35 87.27 195 58.85 42.77 63.47 42.92 46.19 56.24 
Source: Computed by authors from WDI 2018 and the WGI 2018. Note: (***), (**) (*) denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Institutional quality (IQ) indicators are RL (Rule of law); RQ (Regulatory quality); GE (Governance effectiveness); CC (Control of corruption); PS (Political 
stability) and VA (Voice and accountability).  
 
 
 
 
Table 3: System dynamic panel-data estimates of natural resource rents on economic growth. Dependent variable GDP growth rates   
Variables Estimates for share of natural resource rents to GDP Estimates for share of ores and metal of total export 
 
 
Model 1 
RL 
Col.1 
Model 2 
CC 
Col.2 
Model 3 
PS 
Col.3 
Model 4 
GE 
Col.4 
Model 5 
RQ 
Col.5 
Model 6 
VA 
Col.6 
Model 1 
RL 
Col.7 
Model 2 
CC 
Col.8 
Model 3 
PS 
Col.9 
Model 4 
GE 
Col.10 
Model 5 
RQ 
Col.11 
Model 6 
VA 
Col.12 
One lagged GDP 0.035 
(0.051) 
0.015 
(0.048) 
0.099** 
(0.050) 
0.106** 
(0.049) 
0.0074 
(0.048) 
0.087* 
(0049) 
-0.203*** 
(0.056) 
 
-0.170** 
(0.056) 
-0.237*** 
(0.054) 
 
-241*** 
(0.056) 
 
-0.135** 
(0.054) 
 
-0.184*** 
(0.056) 
 
Natural resources rent 
% GDP 
-0.372*** 
(0.081) 
-0.353*** 
(0.071) 
-0.057 
(0.060) 
-0.003 
(0.094) 
-0.104* 
(0.062) 
-0.245*** 
(0.073) 
      
(Natural resources rent 
% GDP *IQ)2 
0.003*** 
(0.0008) 
0.004*** 
(0.009) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
      
Ores and metal export % of total 
export 
      0.018 
(0.024) 
0.0138 
(0.026) 
0.043** 
(0.021) 
0.058** 
(0.025) 
-0.021 
(0.023) 
-0.020 
(0.023) 
(Ores and metal export % of total 
export *IQ)2 
      -0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
Inflation 
 
-0.149** 
(0.050) 
-0.125** 
(0.048) 
-0.107** 
(0.049) 
-0.151** 
(0.051) 
-0.145** 
(0.051) 
-0.115** 
(0.050) 
0.086* 
(0.045) 
0.044 
(0.047) 
0.012 
(0.046) 
0.032 
(0.047) 
0.089* 
(0.047) 
0.070 
(0.046) 
Population growth 2.470** 
(1.064) 
0.499 
(1.082) 
3.572*** 
(1.094) 
3.568*** 
(1.067) 
2.253** 
(1.075) 
2.523** 
(1.112) 
0.087 
(0.761) 
-0.313 
(0.734) 
-0.813 
(0.667) 
0.152 
(0.739) 
0.670 
(0.734) 
0.573 
(0.801) 
Human capital -0.0628 
(0.040) 
-0.105** 
(0.039) 
-0.067 
(0.0432) 
-0.043 
(0.044) 
-0.055 
(0.042) 
-0.075* 
(0.043) 
-0.083** 
(0.030) 
-0.063** 
(0.033) 
-0.101*** 
(0.029) 
-0.086** 
(0.0319) 
-0.065** 
(0.032) 
-0.066** 
(0.031) 
Investment -0.033 
(0.050) 
-0.026 
(0.050) 
-0.044 
(0.0485) 
-0.084* 
(0.049) 
-0.057 
(0.049) 
-0.048 
(0.049) 
0.111** 
(0.048) 
0.099** 
(0.049) 
0.164*** 
(0.048) 
0.100** 
(0.046) 
0.107** 
(0.051) 
0.169*** 
(0.049) 
Trade openness 0.014 
(0.028) 
0.005 
(0.027) 
-0.008 
(0.028) 
0.019 
(0.026) 
-0.010 
(0.029) 
0.001 
(0.029) 
-0.061** 
(0.022) 
-0.419* 
(0.022) 
-0.049** 
(0.025) 
-0.047** 
(0.020) 
-0.046** 
(0.026) 
-0.088*** 
(0.023) 
Initial level of GDP per capita 1.285 
(0.978) 
0.704 
(0.964) 
3.089** 
(1.163) 
1.575 
(1.004) 
1.219 
(0.904) 
1.802* 
(1.067) 
3.117*** 
(0.938) 
1.545* 
(0.896) 
2.458** 
(0.862) 
3.167*** 
(0.882) 
1.396 
(0.915) 
2.493** 
(0.873) 
Constant -3.310 
(7.60) 
7.580 
(7.759) 
-19.66** 
(8.421) 
-11.45 
(7.184) 
-2.956 
(7.13) 
-6.716 
(8.059) 
-11.256 
(5.829) 
-1.326 
(0.818) 
-5.172 
(5.201) 
-12.003 
(5.437) 
-2.672 
(5.761) 
-8.147 
(5.529) 
Wald chi (2) 52.13 58.83 35.56 39.80 30.43 44.37 31.21 19.51 43.72 39.29 24.58 43.55 
Source: Computed by authors from WDI 2018 and the WGI 2018. Note: (***), (**) (*) denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Institutional quality (IQ) indicators are RL (Rule of law); RQ (Regulatory quality); GE (Governance effectiveness); CC (Control of corruption); PS (Political 
stability) and VA (Voice and accountability).  
 
 
 
Table 4: Panel Threshold estimations for natural resource rents on economic growth. Dependent variable GDP growth rates   
Variables Estimates for share of natural resource rents to GDP Estimates for share of ores and metal of total export 
 
 
Model 1 
RL 
Col.1 
Model 2 
CC 
Col.2 
Model 3 
GE 
Col.3 
Model 4 
RQ 
Col.4 
Model 5 
VA 
Col.5 
Model 1 
RL 
Col.6 
Model 2 
CC 
Col.7 
Model 3 
PS 
Col.8 
Model 4 
RQ 
Col.9 
Model 5 
VA 
Col.10 
Natural resources rent (    -0.040 
(0.039) 
0.022 
(0.036) 
-0.124 
(0.142) 
0.066 
(0.041) 
0.208 
(0.135) 
     
Natural resources rent*(    0.235*** 
(0.052) 
0.254*** 
(0.051) 
0.258 
(0.169) 
0.305*** 
(0.049) 
-0.086 
(0.132) 
     
Ores and metal export (         -0.471** 
(0.198) 
0.173** 
(0.081) 
0.103 
(0.072) 
-0.076** 
(0.024) 
0.675*** 
(0.166) 
Ores and metal export*(         0.467** 
(0.199) 
-0.188** 
(0.084) 
-0.112 
(0.0738) 
0.070*** 
(0.0171) 
-0.60*** 
(0.161) 
Population growth -0.014 
(0.556) 
0.075 
(0.651) 
-0.101 
(0.563) 
-0.925* 
(0.568) 
0.783 
(0.735 
0.250 
(0.657) 
0.165 
(0.644) 
0.606 
(0.662) 
-0.032 
(0.650) 
0.399 
(1.60) 
Trade openness 0.001 
(0.015) 
0.008 
(0.015) 
0.001 
(0.015) 
0.007 
(0.014) 
0.025 
(0.241) 
-0.017 
(0.018) 
-0.012 
(0.017) 
-0.012 
(0.0179) 
-0.014 
(0.017) 
0.068 
(0.042) 
Human capital -0.037** 
(0.018) 
-0.048** 
(0.023) 
-0.022 
(0.023) 
-0.055** 
(0.022) 
-0.015 
(0.027) 
-0.044** 
(0.021) 
-0.037 
(0.020) 
-0.046** 
(0.020) 
-0.047** 
(0.020) 
-0.037 
(0.037) 
Initial level of GDP per capita 0.675 
(0.562) 
0.843 
(0.561) 
-0.165 
(0.546) 
0.455 
(0.581) 
0.454 
(0.670 
1.189** 
(0.519) 
1.075** 
(0.519) 
1.630** 
(0.551) 
1.121** 
(0.521) 
1.639 
(1.616) 
Inflation (    -0.125* 
(0.070) 
0.078** 
(0.032) 
1.726** 
(0.547) 
0.091 
(0.069) 
-0.635 
(0.462) 
-0.323** 
(0.111) 
-0.303** 
(0.101) 
-0.288*** 
(0.09) 
-0.698** 
(0.226) 
-0.097 
(0.146) 
Investment     0.128* 
(0.052) 
0.049 
(0.034) 
-1.068** 
(0.335) 
0.059 
(0.041) 
0.158 
0.236 
0.186** 
(0.087) 
0.155** 
(0.068) 
0.166** 
(0.066) 
0.390** 
(0.150) 
-0.196 
(0.138) 
Inflation*      0.085 
(0.056) 
-0.114*** 
(-0.033) 
-1.479** 
(0.548) 
0.024 
(0.07) 
0.656 
(0.463) 
0.332** 
(0.116) 
0.310** 
(0.108) 
0.314*** 
(0.098) 
0.693** 
(0.230) 
-0.20 
(0.138) 
Investment*     -0.137** 
(0.052) 
-0.0385 
(0.0366) 
1.095** 
(0.357) 
-0.133*** 
(0.035) 
-0.165 
(0.152) 
-0.126 
(0.082) 
-0.097 
(0.065) 
-0.112* 
(0.059) 
-0.323** 
(0.146) 
0.057 
(0.054) 
R2 0.253 0.252 0.225 0.356 0.204 0333 0.338 0.342 0.333 0.508 
C1 [( )] -1.361 -1.244 -1.283 -1.232 -1.180 -1.141 -1.004 -1.405 -1.226 -1.413 
C2 [( )] -1.034 -0.154 -1.332 -0.567      0.054 
Gama [(  ] 800.9 464.6 681.5 8596 135.24 2522.9 20259 27 61 18928 
Source: Computed by authors from WDI 2018 and the WGI 2018. Note: (***), (**) (*) denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Institutional quality (IQ) indicators are RL (Rule of law); RQ (Regulatory quality); GE (Governance effectiveness); CC (Control of corruption) and VA (Voice and 
accountability).  
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Table 1A: Descriptive statistics (1996-2016)  
Variables Observations Mean Standard    
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Gross Domestic Product Growth 914 4.937 9.585 -62.073 149.972 
Rule of law 792 -0.725 0.564 -2.130 0.730 
Regulatory quality 792 -0.682 0.563 -2.297 0.804 
Control of corruption 792 -0.681 0.554 -1.805 1.216 
Governance effectiveness 792 -0.763 0.559 -1.890 1.020 
Political stability 792 -0.555 0.855 -2.5 1.020 
Voice and accountability 792 -0.641 0.661 -2.00 0.862 
Ores and metal exports 672 12.937 19.606 000 86.419 
Natural Resources rent 908 14.427 13.722 0.184 74.40 
Inflation 853 15.735 145.796 -9.797 4145.108 
Trade openness 886 74.558 45.511 17.858 531.737 
Investment 860 21.078 15.840 -2.424 219.069 
Human capital 520 40.887 23.74 5.210 107.588 
Population Growth 924 2.559 0.892 -0.036 7.917 
Initial level of GDP per capita 894 6.845 0.966 4.751 9.705 
Source: Computed by authors from WDI 2018 and the WGI 2018. 
 
Table 2A:  Im et al (2003) Unit Root Test Statistics 
Variables Statistics Significance level 
Gross Domestic Product Growth -17.468 0.000 
Rule of law -7.581 0.000 
Regulatory quality -5.861 0.000 
Control of corruption -7.959 0.000 
Governance effectiveness -5.66 0.000 
Political stability -11.212 0.003 
Voice and accountability -2.686 0.000 
Ores and metal exports -5.616 0.000 
Natural Resources rent -3.14 0.000 
Inflation -10.488 0.000 
Trade openness -21.30 0.000 
Investment 1.39 0.080 
Human capital - - 
Population Growth -19.070 0.000 
Initial level of GDP per capita -35.992 0.000 
Source: Computed by authors from WDI 2018 and the WGI 2018  
 
 
Table 3A: Sargan test of Over-identifying restrictions  
Variables Sargan(score) chi2(1) Basman (score) chi2(1) 
Rule of law 4.821 [p=0.089] 4.922 [p=0.085] 
Regulatory quality 5.069 [p=0.079] 5.208 [p=0.074] 
Control of corruption 2.970 [p=0.225] 2.904 [p=0.234] 
Governance effectiveness 3.583 [p=0.166] 3.540 [p=0.169] 
Voice and accountability 5.651 [p=0.059] 5.895 [p=0.059] 
Political stability 1.790 [p=0.408] 1.690 [p=0.428] 
Source: Computed by authors from WDI 2018 and the WGI 2018  
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Table 4A List of Countries used in constructing the panel data 
Algeria Chad Gabon Guinea-Bissau Sao Tome and Principe 
Angola Comoros Gambia Kenya Senegal 
Benin Congo, Dem. Rep. Ghana Lesotho Sierra Leone 
Botswana Congo, Rep. Tunisia Liberia Zimbabwe 
Burkina Faso Ivory Coast Uganda Libya  
Burundi Swaziland Zambia Madagascar  
Cameroon Tanzania Namibia Malawi  
Central African 
Republic 
Togo Niger Mali  
South Africa Egypt, Arab Rep. Nigeria Mauritania  
Sudan Equatorial Guinea Rwanda Mauritius  
Source: Computed by authors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
